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THE EXPANSION OP MANUFACTURED EXPORTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OP SUPPLY AND DEMAND ISSUES*
I. Introduction
Economist's thinking about the role of international trade in the
process of economic development exhibits a cyclical behaviour. The
classical thinking, which held sway until the 1930s, emphasized the
crucial role of trade in promoting growth through the optimal alloca-
tion of resources made possible by the exploitation of international
comparative advantage. By the 1950s, after years of frustration and
disappointment in attempting to foster development on the basis of
primary commodity exports, many economists, particularly those asso-
ciated with the Latin American experience, rejected the logic of the
classical argument, maintaining instead that underdevelopment is a
fundamental problem of transforming the structure of an economy and
not of merely achieving marginal optimality in the allocation of
resources. Furthermore, imperfections of the international trading
framework, such as increasing oligopolistic competition, discriminatory
pricing on world markets and product differentiation, discredited
deeply the idea of an export-led growth for developing countries. The
economic consequence of the new viewpoint was a fundamental rejection
of the market mechanism in favour of direct intervention and control
of economic decision-making. The main tactic of this strategy was to
force the substitution of imports with domestic production by control-
ling investment decisions and protecting the domestic market from
international competition. Qy the mid-1960s, however, this strategy,
or at least the tactics employed to pursue it, had proved unsuccess-
ful (in terms of sustained growth, adequate expansion of industrial
employment and removal of severe balance of payments constraints), in
many instances only exacerbating problems they were designed to cure.
j
This paper reports on research undertaken in the Sonderforschungs-
bereich 86 ("Weltwirtschaft und intemationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen"),
Projekt IA, with financial support provided by the German Research
Foundation.- 2 -
At the same time an exclusive group of small, developing economies
was demonstrating that the classical wisdom still held some merit -
trade could be an engine of growth. As a result of the failure of
the import-substitution strategy, on the one hand, and the success
of several export-oriented industrialization experiences, on the
other, there emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s a "new
orthodoxy", maintaining that trade, specifically the export of
labour-intensive manufactures, was a viable avenue to industrializa-
tion, but allowing an activist governmental role in promoting export
expansion. Once again, within only the last few years, a revival
of anti-trade sentiment has begun to emerge. However, in contrast
to the earlier movement which perceived supply constraints to be the
primary limitations to export-led growth, the new wave of skepticism
emphasizes obstacles on the demand side. This notion is expressed
most commonly by the so-called "fallacy of composition argument":
"if all small countries adopt ... [export promotionJ policies on the
assumption that their individual impact upon the world market for
labour-intensive manufactures will be small, the total impact may
nevertheless be large and may generate the market barriers which
-i
each alone could successfully have avoided."
There are (at least) three crucial-empirical issues involved
in the current debate on the role of trade in economic development:
(1) Is an export-oriented approach (specifically,
specialization in labour-intensive manufactures)
the "best" way to foster industrialization?
(2) Is export performance responsive to governmental
promotion efforts?
G.K. Helleiner, "Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries
and Multinational Firms", Economic Journal, Vol. 83, March 1973, p. 27.
Also expressed for example in P. Streeten, "Trade Strategies for
Development: Some Themes for the Seventies", in: P. Streeten (ed.),
Trade Strategies for Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973),
p. 17.„ "z —
(3) Is a lack of demand the ultimate obstacle to the
expansion of manufactured exports in IDCs?
The first question is the most profound one, but it is also the
least interesting. Certainly there is no one "best" way to achieve
economic development in all countries, nor is there any panacea for
the problems of IDCs. The role of trade in development is bound to
be different in different countries, yet it is likely to be one,
if not the most important, element in all. The second and third
questions are of far more immediate relevance. Although both have
been heavily discussed in the literature, few attempts have been
made to assess them empirically. This is the purpose of the
present paper.
In assessing the question of how effective economic policy is in
promoting export expansion (from here on when speaking of exports we
mean exports of manufactures) we draw on empirical evidence that emerged
from 15 country-studies undertaken at the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft,
Kiel, during recent years. The Kiel project was conceived as an exten-
tion of the work initiated by the O.E.C.D. country-study project which
provided the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the broad issues
p
of trade and industrialization. The aim of the Kiel project was to take
"The countries studied were: Brazil (Tyler); Colombia (Wogart); Egypt
(Girgis); Hong Kong (Riedel); India (Banerji); Israel (Pomfret); South
Korea (Stecher); Malaysia (Hoffmann); Mexico (Muller-Ohlsen);
Pakistan (Mujahid); Singapore (Lotz); Spain (Donges); Taiwan (Riedel);
Turkey (Muller-Ohlsen); Yugoslavia (Chittle). A complete bibliography
of the Project publications is given in Appendix Table A-l. Taken as
a whole, these countries, in the early 1970s, accounted for 57 percent
of LDCs' gross national product, 5^ percent of LDCs' population and
75 percent of both LDCs' manufacturing value added and LDCs' manufactured
exports. (LDCs are defined according to O.E.C.D. and World Bank). For
distinct inter-country differences in economic variables which are
important for the purpose at hand, see Appendix Tables A-2 and A=3«
2
I. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some
Developing Countries: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press
for the O.E.C.D., 1971). Additional empirical research on these lines
was sponsored by the World Bank and the National Bureau of Economic
Research: See B. Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection
in Developing Countries (Baltimore/Md., London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1971); J.N. Bhagwati, A.O. Krueger, Foreign Trade
Regimes and Economic Development, publication in two separate volumes,
forthcoming.a more narrow focus, examining primarily the role of manufactured
export expansion in the industrialization process with a view of
assessing the export potential of developing countries. Within these
terms of reference, however, each author was free to define
the issues and to pattern his analysis according to the special
circumstances and data availability in the country concerned. As a
result, each country study will have to speak for itself and many
of the most interesting results coming out of these studies are not
readily comparable. However one area that was treated comparably
in most of the studies was the description and analysis of the impact
of economic policy affecting the external sector as it evolved over
the last two decades. These results and descriptive information are
brought together here in an attempt to determine whether any common
patterns or generalizations can be established concerning the effective-
ness of government policy in stimulating export expansion.
The question of the demand for manufactured exports of LDCs was
not examined in depth in any of the country studies, however. In order
to assess this issue we bring together fragmentary empirical evidence
emerging in the literature in several areas concerning the location,
size, growth and trade restrictions in the major markets for LDCs
1
exports of manufactures.
II. Economic Policy and Export Expansion in a Sample of LDCs
In attempting to establish whether any common generalizations
emerge from the Kiel Project country-studies concerning the impact of
government policy on export expansion, we proceed in the following
way. First, we profile the evolution of major post-war policies affecting
the external sector in the Sample countries, exploring whether any
Lessons for policy-making purposes can nevertheless be drawn. See
J.B. Donges, "Conditions for Successful Import Substitution and
Export Diversification in LDCs: A Summary Appraisal", in: H. Giersch
(ed.), The International Division of Labour - Problems and Perspectives
(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1974), pp. 336-356.- 5 ~
common patterns can be traced and trying to ascertain actual
turning points in the direction of policy. If such turning points
are apparent, we then examine whether (manufactured) export
performance (i.e. growth) reflects these discernible shifts in
policy. And we summarize the results of estimation of so-called
"export-functions" — quasi export supply functions — for several
of the Project countries with a view of demonstrating which domestic
economic policies ors more accurately, sets of economic policies
are most effective. Third, we describe the pattern of international
specialization to which such policies have laid the groundwork.
And finally, the (supply) potential of the Project countries to
increase their manufactured exports is appraised.
The Configuration of Economic Policies
A profile of post-war industrialization and trade policies in the
Sample countries is provided in Table I. The table is constructed from
descriptive information provided in the individual country-studies and
is intended to reveal major policies adopted and to indicate in
general when they became effective and/or were discontinued. No doubt
we have erred, in some instances associating with a given country a
policy that may not have been important, and in other cases overlooking
policies that more astute country-specialists would consider major.
In order to avoid a lengthy discussion of economic policy in each
country we have chosen, no doubt at some risk, in favour of a
concise presentation in this form.
Shifting through the table one observes several notable aspects
of economic policy common to most of the Sample countries:
(1) All countries, with the exception of Hong Kong and to a
lesser extent Singapore and Malaysia, have relied extensively
on governmental intervention.- 6 -
Table I
A PROFILE OF MAJOR POST-WAR INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TRADE POLICIES IN THE KIEL SAMPLE COUNTRIES





i) Industrial licensing system under which establishment,
expansion and both sectoral and geographical alteration
of industrial activities require governmental approval.
ii) Selective promotion (generally by tax incentives) of
industries designated as "essential", "desirable" or
"pioneering".
iii) Creation of industrial estates.
iv) Price controls (at times) on selected industrial goods
required as inputs by "priority sectors".
v) National plans for economic development over three and
more years (indicative for the private sector,
conyulsory for the public sector).
vi) Direct government investment in industry (public
enterprises).
i) Minimum wage legislation (including high social charges
and severance pay regulations).
ii) Interest rates ceilings and/or credit rationing (not
determined by business cycle considerations).
iii) Tax benefits for business income derived from invest-
ment such as several years lasting tax holidays, re-
duction of income or profit tax, tax exemptions or
ceilings, loss-carry-forward provisions, allowances
for accelerated depreciation (not determined by
business cycle considerations).
iv) Exemption from, or reduction of," customs tariffs on
capital goods which are not domestically produced.
i) Prohibition of private foreign investment.
ii) Investment proposals subject to government approval.
iii) Requirement of domestic majority ownership and con-
straints on profit remittances abroad and capital
repratiation.
iv) Exclusion of foreign investment from certain ("key"
and/or "inessential" and/or "saturated") industries.
v) National treatment with virtually no foreign exchange
restrictions and domestic ownership requirements.
vi) Direct subsidies and tax incentives.
Brazil', Egypt (since 1957), India, Mexico,
Pakistan, Spain (relaxed since 1963),
Taiwan (gradually lifted after 1954).
All countries but Hong Kong.
India, Korea (since 1966), Malaysia,
Singapore, Spain (since 1964), Taiwan (since
1965), Turkey (since 1963).
Brazil (since 1965), Colombia, India,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, Turkey,
Yugoslavia.
Brazil (since 1964), Colombia, Egypt (since
1957), India, Israel (since 1958), Korea,
Malaysia (since 1955), Mexico, Pakistan,Spain
(since 1964), Turkey (since 1963), Yugoslavia.
All countries but Hong Kong, Israel, Korea
and Singapore.
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Pakistan (since 1969), Spain
(since 1963).
Brazil (relaxed since 1964), Egypt (since
1957), Korea (relaxed since 1965), Mexico.
All countries but Hong Kong and Yugoslavia,
at varying degree.
Brazil (since 1957), Egypt, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey.
Yugoslavia (until 1967).
Colombia, Egypt, India, Korea, Malaysia
(since 1973), Mexico, Spain (until 1959),
Turkey, Yugoslavia (since 1967).
Colombia, Egypt (gradually liberalized
after 1967), India (selective), Mexico,
Spain (until 1959), Yugoslavia (since 1967).
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Mexico,
Pakistan, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia (since
1967).
Brazil, India, Israel, Korea, Pakistan,
Singapore, Spain (since 1959), Turkey.
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan.
continued ...(continued)
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Area Type of Policies Countries concerned
IMPORTS i) Import licensing combined with quotas and/or, at times,
with prohibitions of certain imports (considered either
as luxury or as locally available).
ii) Tariffs (generally ad-valorem) and other price measures
(such as indirect taxes, surcharges or prior-deposit
requirements), generally with escalating rates from
lower to higher levels of fabrication.
iii) Multiple exchange rates.
EXPORTS i) Licensing for exports (totally or partly) with or
without minimum export price requirements.
ii) Taxes and/or customs duties on exports.
iii) Fixing of export targets.
iv) Remissions and compensation of tariffs on imported
products used in finished exports and exemptions from
indirect taxes on domestic production.
v) Export vouchers for import replenishment with premiums
on their resale, priority allocation of foreign ex-
change to exporters for the importation of necessary
input, or foreign exchange retention quotas.
vi) Income tax concessions for earnings from export
(including special depreciation allowances).
vii) Export credits (at preferential conditions) and
credit insurance.
viii) Exchange-rate policy of gradual devaluation ("sliding
Peg").
ix) Establishment of export processing zones.
x) Participation in international free-trade area.
xi) Government assistance to marketing abroad.
All countries but Hong Kong and Singapore,
at varying degree. Gradual liberalization
in Brazil (after 1957), Colombia (after 1967),
Israel (after 1962), Korea (after I960),
Spain (after 1959) and Taiwan (after 1958).
All countries but Hong Kong,'at varying
degree.
Brazil (1953-57), Colombia, Egypt (1957-62),
Israel (1952-55), Korea (until 1964), Spain
(until 1959), Taiwan (until 1963), Turkey
(until 1960), Yugoslavia (until 1961).
Brazil (until 1964), Colombia (since 1973),
Egypt (since 1959), India, Malaysia (until
1969), Pakistan, Spain (until 1959), Taiwan
(until 1958), Turkey (gradually liberalized
after 1958), Yugoslavia.
Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,
Spain (until 1959), Taiwan (until 1954).
Korea (since 1962), India (since 1970).
All countries, mostly starting in the early
sixties.
Colombia, Egypt (temporarily since I960),
India, Korea (until 1960), Mexico, Pakistan,
Taiwan (until 1963), Turkey (since 1968),
Yugoslavia (since 1966).
Brazil (until 1971), Colombia (since 1967),
India (since 1960), Israel (since 1965),
Korea (since 1961), Malaysia, Mexico (since
1958), Pakistan (since 1963), Singapore,
Taiwan (since 1960), Turkey (since 1969).
All countries but Hong Kong and Singapore,
at varying degree and starting in the sixties
Brazil (since 1968), Colombia (since 1967),
Israel (since 1975), Korea (since 1965).
Colombia (since 1970), Hong Kong, India
(since 1972), -Korea (since 1970), Malaysia
(since 1972), Mexico (since 1962), Singapore,
Taiwan (since 1966).
Brazil (since 1961), Colombia (since 1961 and
1969), Hong Kong, India, Israel (since 1975),
Malaysia, Mexico (since 1961), Pakistan,
Singapore, Turkey (since 1964).
All countries, at varying degree and
generally beginning in the sixties.
Source: Elaborated from information provided by the authors of the country studies.- 8 -
(2) Governments have intervened both directly through
controls on investment and trade and indirectly
through taxes, subsidies and other measures affect-
ing market prices both of factors and products.
(3) Reliance on direct controls appears to have been more
pervasive in the first decade (generally the 1950s)
than during the latter decade. Most countries appear
to have moved, in some cases gradually (e.g. India,
Israel, Colombia, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Mexico) in
others more or less abruptly (e.g. Taiwan, Spain, Brazil,
and South Korea) toward a greater reliance on the market
mechanism, as tempered of course by continued governmental
intervention.
(4) The aim of economic policy also appears to have shifted
away from the single-minded devotion to import substitu-
tion which was characteristic in most of the Sample
countries (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Spain, India, Colombia,
Egypt and to a lesser extent Taiwan and South Korea).
Changes in economic policy in the 1960s took the form
of either (i) reducing the detrimental effects on the
export sector of policies aimed at other objectives (as
in e.g. India, Mexico, Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent
Spain) or (ii) of outright promotion of export expansion
(as in e.g. Taiwan, South Korea9 Brazil (after 1968),
Malaysia, Pakistan and Colombia (after 1967))•
The literature on the experience of import substitution
strategy which emerged in the late 1960s reads like a catalogue of
horrors, listing in detail for country after country the excesses of
the strategy and how many of the key policies (e.g. protection) only
acted to exacerbate problems they were designed to relieve (e.g.
balance of payments). Evidence available in the Kiel country-study
project, as well as that coming out of a similar project carried out- 9 -
under the auspices of the N.B.E.R., suggests that export promotion
policies have likewise entailed in many instances excessive resource
costs, although, as the N.B.E.R. results also indicate, "the economic
cost of incentives distorted toward export promotion appears to have
been less than the cost of those distorted toward import-substitution,
and the growth performance of the countries oriented toward export
promotion appears to have been more satisfactory than that of the
import-substitution oriented countries."
Our purpose here, however, is not to assess the economic costs
p
of export promotion policy, but rather to ascertain whether such a
policy is effective in stimulating export growth. As we observe in
going through Table I, most countries in our Sample if not aiming
to promote export expansion directly have at least tried to reduce
the debilitating impact on the export sector of policies aimed at
other objectives. Although it is rather difficult to determine the
precise turning point of economic policy in individual countries
since in some instances the changes move very gradually, a review
of the information presented in Table I suggests the following







J.N. Bhagwati and K.O. Krueger, "Exchange Control, Liberalization
and Economic Development", The American Economic Review, Vol. 63
(May 1973), P. 420.
2For Brazil [ll], Egypt [19], India [26] , Israel [31] , and Spain [57]
it has been found that the policy encouragement has tended to go to
industries whose exports involve higher costs to the economy than the
earnings they yield (number in brackets refer to Table A-l). The

















The Policy Impact on Export Performance
In order to determine whether economic policy has had an
impact on export performance, albeit on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, we examine whether the (logarithmic) time trend of manu-
factured exports exhibits shifts in intercept or slope at times
associated with policy reorientation. This is accomplished by
estimating the following trend function:
in (Et / ?t) - a + b t + c D + d (D • t) + et
where
E. = value of manufactured exports in year t.
P. = export price deflator, generally a unit value index.
t = year, with the initial year varying from country to
country but generally 195^-73•
0 for years prior to policy change
1 for years after the policy change
and where e. is an unexplained residual assumed to have the
necessary properties. Estimating the trend function in its fully
unrestricted form (as specified above) yields the same results as
performing separate regressions for the two subperiods, before and- 11 -
after the policy change, although the unrestricted version yields
a more efficient estimate. In this form the coefficients a and b
indicate the intercept and trend parameters in the early period (i.e.
over which D = 0), whereas c and d indicate change in intercept
and slope between the two subperiods. A significant positive value
for d is interpreted as evidence that policy change has had a
positive influence on export performance (i.e. increased export
growth rate).
The results of estimation of the trend function for the twelve
Sample Countries in which a distinct policy shift was apparent (i.e.
excluding Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore) are presented in Table II.
The policy (dummy) variable for each country was defined according to
the above schedule of policy turning points. Examining the table we
find that in 8 out of 12 of the Sample Countries a strong association
between change in economic policy and change in export performance
is observed. The exceptions are Colombia, Israel, Egypt and
Yugoslavia. The unexpected results for Colombia and Israel appear,
on closer inspection of the historical series, to derive from the
fact that both countries started industrial export expansion from an
exceptionally low base in the 1950s. The results with regard to
Egypt and Yugoslavia may derive from the fact that, as Girgis [19]
and Chittle [69] show, both countries have relied heavily on bilateral
state trading arrangement rendering the connection between policy
and performance rather weak. Despite these exceptions the strong
association between policy reorientation and improved export
performance does suggest that government has leverage. Moreover, we
observed that in those countries where government made the greatest
efforts to encourage export activities (Taiwan, South Korea, Spain,
•1
Pakistan, Brazil) increases in export growth are the highest.
In addition to Table A-3, see the comparative study by J.B. Donges,
"Die Entwicklungslander als Anbieter industrieller Erzeugnisse",
Die Weltwirtschaft, 1971, No. 1, pp. Hi sqq.Table II











































































































































































Source: Data extracted from Country-study publications.Bifeliothek des
- 13 - fur Weltwirtschafi Kiel
Although this exercise provides prima facie evidence that
economic policy is effective in stimulating export growth, it
suggests nothing about which policies have been most effective.
Singling out the importance of individual policies is of course
a difficult, if not impossible task, since individual measures
are often introduced simultaneously and many are intangible and
defy quantification. Nevertheless, an effort was made in a number
of the country-studies to measure the main determinants of export
performance and in so doing establish where government's leverage
is likely to be greatest. The determinants of export performance
were analyzed by estimation of so-called "export functions" which
consist primarily of supply variables, a "small-country" assumption
having been made to the effect that the country faces a perfectly
elastic demand for its exports in world markets.
The basic model estimated was of the form:
taEt = a + b Jin Rt + c £n
where
E. = manufactured exports in year t, in most
instances deflated
Rt = exchange rate, variously defined
It = index of industrial production
In this form the regression model resembles an export supply function,
with R measuring movement along the function and I accounting for
shifts in the function. The price variable R was measured in various
A formal elaboration of this function is given in W.G. Tyler,
"Methodological Notes on Analyzing the Manufactured Export Performance
in Less Developed Countries", Kiel Discussion Papers, No. 28,
February 1973» pp. 4 sqq.ways in the individual country studies according to data availability.
In general the variable was termed the "real effective exchange rate"




r = formal exchange rate (domestic currency per US-S5)
vis-st-vis major trading partner(s), weighted in most
cases by export shares
P = "world price"s or price received by exporters;
often defined as weighted average of wholesale prices
of manufactures in major importing countries or as the
unit value index of exports. In several instances
(Brazil, Colombia and Israel) the variable was ad-
justed to include domestic subsidies received for
exporting
P, = domestic wholesale price of manufactures.
Given this definition of R, the coefficient b is more appropriately
considered a price substitution parameter indicating the price elasticity
of exporting versus supplying of the domestic market. A significant,
positive estimated coefficient implies that producers are responsive
to marginal financial incentives to export. The coefficient with
respect to industrial production, c, indicates the degree of export
bias associated with industrial expansion in a given country.
Although the country studies employed the "small country"
assumption in order to avoid consideration of world demand, a similar
assumption vis-a-vis the domestic market was not generally made.
However, rather than estimate a simultaneous model of export supply
and domestic demand, the studies chose the approach of including a- 15
domestic demand variable in the single-equation export function.
This variable was included in order to pick up "recession-boom"
effects which are suggested by the classical "vent-for-surplus"
theory of trade. Accordingly, the basic model was extended to
= a + b in F?t + c Jin Ifc + d in
where
U. = capacity utilization, defined as deviations from
the semi-log time trend of industrial production
(inlt = a + 6 t + et ; Ut = efc + 100).
Aside from the problems of simultaneity j inclusion of the
"recession-boom" variable, U, seems to be unfortunate because it
violates the necessary assumption of independence between explanatory
variables. Since U, in this case, is defined in terms of I3 it
becomes difficult to accurately interpret the value or significance
of the regression coefficients. In fact, one observes;, in those
instances where alternative specifications of the model were
presented, that the sign or significance of the coefficient of U
changed when included together in the model with I as opposed
to when run without I included. Therefore, in summarizing the
country study estimation results we shall avoid interpreting the
"recession-boom" coefficient. We note, however., that the presence
of U did not seriously distort the coefficient of I since the
latter was in all cases a far more dominant variable.
The estimation results with respect to the exchange rate
variable and the industrial production variable are presented in
Table III. In presenting the results we have elected not to
describe the exact definition of variables or precise specifica-
tion of the model employed in the individual studies, although
a number of variations in both regards are involved. We are
bound to point out, therefore, that because of such unexplained- 16 -
Table III
EXPORT-FUNCTION ESTIMATES IN SAMPLE COUNTRIES
Country
: Time
period rate index the
analyzed parameter parameter (R2)
Estimated Estimated Explanatory









































Notes: a : production index is measured by capital stock in the manu-
facturing sector rather than industrial production index.
*: indicates not statistically different from zero.
**: indicates not statistically different from one.
Sources: Appendix Table A-l.
differences the individual results may not be strictly comparable.
Neverthelesss a considerable degree of uniformity is apparent in the
results. We find, first of all, that the model in every case was able
to explain about 90 % of the variation in the dependent variable,
exports. In every case, except Colombia, the exchange rate variable
proved significant and of the expected sign. There is, however,
little consistency among the various estimates concerning the- 17 -
absolute value of the exchange rate coefficient, which may indeed
reflect differences in definition of R. Likewise, little con-
sistency is observed with regard to the shift parameter (indus-
trial production). In this case, differences stem not from variation
in definition of the variable, but rather more likely from differ-
ences in economic structure and government policy in the various
countries. Not surprisingly we find the greatest export bias to
industrial growth in the smallest and most export-oriented of the
Sample countries (Colombia, Israel and Taiwan, with Spain being
somewhat of an exception in this regard).
Although the country studies established that manufacturers
are responsive to relative prices in export and domestic markets,
they did not determine to what extent changes in export supply
resulted from movement in relative prices and to what extent from
shifts in the supply function. An exception was the case of Taiwan [60],
where it was found that shifts in the export supply function
accounted for 85 percent of the explained increases in export supply.
We suspect that a similar conclusion would emerge if the same
analysis was performed on the other countries, particularly those
that have experienced a recent export boom (South Korea, Brazil
and Spain).
The major finding to emerge from the estimation of the export
function is that export supply is responsive to financial incentive.
This result underlines the importance of establishing and maintaining
an appropriate exchange rate if a country should embark on an export-
oriented strategy of development. It also suggests that tax and
Using Tyszynski's "constant market share analysis" we found that
improved supply competitiveness accounts for more than four fifths
of the absolute increase of manufactured exports in South Korea and
Brazil and for almost three fifths of that in Spain (period of exa-
mination: 1960-73). The comparable figure for Taiwan is 79 percent.
These ratios are remarkably higher than the one which Banerji found
for the LDCs as a whole (27 percent in 1962-70). See his "The Export
Performance of Less Developed Countries: A Constant Market Share
Analysis", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 110 (197
1*), No. 2,
pp. 458 sqq.- 18 -
subsidy incentivess if not perfectly rational in terms of welfare,
should nevertheless be effective in stimulating export growth.
It should be recalled., however, that the estimated price parameter
only measures substitution between domestic and export markets;
no doubt price incentives created or destroyed by governmental
policy also have a substantial impact on investment decisions which
are captured in the industrial production (supply shift) variable.
The export functions, therefore, although providing interesting
information concerning the price elasticity of substitution between
alternative markets, leave much to be desired as an explanation of
which policies are most effective. It is probable that the efforts
to single out policies is futile in any case, since numerous measures
working in conjunction are generally required to achieve a desired
policy objective. It is also possible, particularly in the case of
a general liberalization of economic policy which one observes
in most of the Sample countries in the 1960s, that entrepreneurs
are impressed less by the provision of positive financial incentives
than by the expressed intent of government not to impose additional
negative incentives.
The Pattern of International Specialization
The responsiveness of export activities to economic policies
reflects itself in the large array of different products which the
Sample countries have been selling abroad since the shift of the
industrialization strategy occurred. Although many items are still
quite small in value in most of the countries studied, together
they can be taken as an indicator of the significant potential
developing countries have to become internationally competitive. As
only some of the country studies (e.g. Egypt, Israel, Spain) have
analyzed in depth the specialization pattern which emerged after
policies were changed, we have extended this analysis and shall
combine here the evidence for all 15 countries into one common
picture.- 19 -
The analytical tool which we have used to approach this issue3
is Balassa's concept of "revealed conparative advantages" (RCA) in
combination with the changes over time of the Sample countries'
shares in world exports. Balassa's RCA-concept rests on the
assumption that a country's imports indicate which of the domestic
industries are non-competitive3 while the country's exports points
to the industries which display comparative competitiveness. Hences
by comparing the export-minus-import balance of any single product
category with the trade balance of the whole industrys it becomes
possible to identify the manufacturing activities in which industria-
lizing countries can be expected to have (actually) comparative
advantages in international trade.
At least three objections can be made to this methods which
should be briefly discussed before reporting on the results of the
computations. One is that the RCA indices can describe the trade
patterns that have taken place3 but they cannot tell whether those
patterns are optimum ones. It is possible to infer what developing
countries can do in the field of industrial expansion not what they
should do on theoretical grounds. The latter prescription can only
be made, if at all, on the basis of individual country studies in
which particular factor endowments can be taken into account. A
second objection is that export prices are assumed implicitly to be
the same to all markets of destination and that imports of LDCs
are all influenced in the same way by protective measures 3 transport
costs a taste structure, traditional ties and the like. We rejected
the inclusion of these factors3 since the lack of reliable data would
only have permitted guesswork. The third possible objection is that
the RCA indices themselves are highly sensitive to the choice of
years and the level of aggregation. As to years, they may reflect
cyclical conditions; we tried to neutralize at least partly this
eventuality by using two-years-averages. As to aggregations a high
degree leads to as meaningless results as a very low degree. The
See his article "Trade Liberalization and Revealed Comparative
Advantage"3 The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies.
Vol. 33 (1965), No. 1, pp. 99 sqq. '- 20 -
appropriate commodity breakdown is the one, in which exports and
imports of a specific product category are comparable with each
other, i.e., have an elasticity of substitution among each other
above zero. It was felt that disaggregation down to the three-digit
(in some instances four-digit) commodity groups of SITC is
appropriate for the purpose at hand.
The following formula has been used to calculate revelaed
comparative advantages for the sample under consideration:
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A value larger than zero indicates that the industrial activity in
question is more competitive than the average industrial activity of
the Sample countries taken as a whole, and vice versa. We have distin-
guished in principle 119 commodity categories which cover reasonably
well the whole manufacturing industry. In fact, however, some commodity
groups have been excluded, because of the lack of data or, more
importantly, an obviously sporadic nature of the trade relations between
the country in question and the rest of the world. The computations
have been made, for the sake of international comparisons, for two
periods: 1962/63 and 1972/73. Prior to the early sixties most manufac-
tured exports from the Sample countries were too small by value to be- 21 -
worth considering in this inquiry; and more recent years could,
for statistical reasons, not be included into the analysis.
The results for the 15 countries combined are given in Table IV,
columns 1 and 2. They reflect the weighted average of the countries'
revealed comparative advantages, the weights being the ratio of
every country's trade volume to the sample's total. According to
these results, the Sample countries as a whole have been increasing
the number of manufacturing activities in which they are at a
competitive advantage: from 36 items in 1962/63 to 53 ten years
later. As it was precisely since the early sixties, that, after
Hong Kong and Singapore, the other 13 countries in the sample also
began to gear industrialization towards export expansion, it is
reasonable to regard the noteworthy increase of relative competitive-
ness as a consequence of the implementation (with varying degree
from one country to the other) of export promotion measures.
Looking at the whole scale in 1972/73, it becomes clear that on
the top of the list of products in which the Kiel Sample countries
keep or have developed a comparative advantage are cotton and non-
cotton fabrics, footwear, textile clothing, tanneries, canned fruit,
household equipment, jewellery and wood products. They all fall into
the category of relatively labour- and/or raw material-intensive
products. The same holds for other commodities, albeit revealing a
lower comparative advantage, such as meat and fish preparations,
building material, cutlery, made-up textile articles, works of art,
perfumery and cosmetics, and leather manufactures. What is inter-
esting as well is the fact that the Sample countries now also possess,
on average, comparative advantage in a number of light engineering
products. Domestic electrical equipment, metal containers, tele-
communication apparatus are the most prominent examples. These (and
other) commodities are instances of typical product-cycle goods whose
technical requirements have become sufficiently standardized to be
produced competitively by semi-industrialized countries of the type- 22 -
Table IV
REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND WORLD MARKET SHARES OF THE SAMPLE COUNTRIES
0
COMBINED BY MANUFACTURED COMMODITY GROUPS, 1962/63 AND 1972/73
Comnodity Group
Food, beverages and tobacco industry
011-013 Meat preparations
022-024 Manufacture of dairy products
053 Canned and preserved fruit
054.6+055 Canned and preserved vegetables
'„ Fish preparations
+UJ/
042.1, 2 Manufacture of rice
046 Flour, meal and groats of wheat
047 Flour, meal and groats of other
cereals
048.1 Cereal preparations
061.1,2, Sugar factories, refineries and
5 + 062 confectionary
+'o* Cocoa and chocolate preparations
411.3 Animal oils and fats
421.5 Olive oil




Textile, shoe and leather industry
651 Textile yarn and thread
652 Cotton fabrics
653 Non-cotton fabrics
654 Tulle, lace etc.
655 Special textile fabrics
656 Made-up textile articles















































































































































































513 Oxygen, nitrogen and metallic oxides
514 Other inorganic chemicals
515 Radioactive and associated materials
531 Synthetic organic dyestuffs
*532 Dyeing and tanning materials
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes
561 Manufactured fertilizers
571 Explosives and pyrotechnic products
581 Plastic materials
599 Other basic industrial chemicals
541 Medicinal & pharmaceutical products
551 Essential oils, perfume & flavour
materials
553 Perfumery and cosmetics
554 Soaps, cleaning & polishing preparations
521 Mineral tar and crude chemicals
Rubber industry


























































































































661 Cement and fabricated building materials




667 Worked pearls and precious stones
663 Other mineral manufactures
Iron and steel basic industry
671 Pig and cast iron,
672 Ingots
673 Bars, shapes etc.
674 Universals, plates and sheets
675 Hoop and strip
676 Rails and construction material
677 Wire
678 Tubes, pipes and fittings
679 Castings and forgings
Non-ferrous metal basic industry
681.2 Silver and platimum (worked)
682.2 Copper and alloys (worked)
683.2 Nickel and alloys (worked)
684.2 Aluminum and alloys (worked)
685.2 Lead and alloys (worked)
686.2 Zinc and alloys (worked)
687.2 Tin and alloys (worked)
689 Miscellaneous non-ferrous metals(worked)
Fabricated metal products industry
691 Finished structural parts
692 Metal containers
693 Wire products



























































































































































Machinery and transport equipment
711 Non-electrical power generating machinery
712 Agricultural machinery & implements
714 Office machines
715 Metalworking machinery
717 Textile and leather machinery
718 Machines for special industries
719 Other non-electrical machines and parts
722 Electric power machinery
723 Electricity distributing machines
724 Telecommunications apparatus
725 Domestic electrical equipment
726 Electrical apparatus for medical purposes
729 Other electrical machinery
731 . Raiway vehicles
732.1,6 Motor cars




733.3-4 Other non-motor vehicles
734 Aircrafts
735 Ships and boats
Other manufacturing industry
861 Scientific, medical and controlling
instruments
862 Photographic supplies
863 Developed cinematographic films
864 Watches and clocks
891 Musical instruments
893 Articles of artificial plastic materials
894 Toys, sporting goods etc.
895 Office and stationary supplies
896 Works of art
897 Jewellery








































































































a Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mexico,
Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
According to SITC.
C For method see text.





















































Source: Computed from United Nations,Commodity Trade Statistics, various issues, supplemented by
national trade statistics. - OECD, "Statistics of Foreign Trade (Trade by Commodities),
various issues.- 26 -
forming our Sample, particularly Spains Yugoslavia, Taiwan and
India.
Additional insights into the emerging pattern of specialization
can be obtained if the RCAs are put into a dynamic dimension. One way
of doing so is the analysis of the development of the Sample's share
in world exports. We chose this approach on the grounds that there
is a positive and statistically significant association between RCAs
and the export shares: the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient
is 0.644 and 0.684 for 1962/63 and 1972/73 respectively. The commodities
which show positive RCAs in 1972/73 were grouped into three
distinguishable categories as follows:
(1) Category I ("leading sectors") includes all products whose
RCA are higher (or equal) in 1972/73 than (to) in 1962/63
and whose incremental share in world exports is larger than
that of all manufactured products together (1.5 percentage
points);
(2) Category II ("latercomers") includes all products with the
RCA pattern of category I, but with below average incremental
share in world exports;
(3) Category III ("matures") includes all products whose RCA are
lower in 1972/73 than ten years earlier, regardless of the
incremental share in world exports.
The corresponding quantification is provided in columns 3S 4 and 5
of Table IV. Out of the 53 products revealing a comparative advantage
at the end of the period under consideration, 27 belong to category I,
18 to category II and 8 to category III. It is noteworthy again that
-1
See P. Wolter, "Engineering Exports of Developing Countries",
Kiel Working Papers, No. 29, March 1975.- 27 -
our Sample countries seem also to be developing for product-cycle
goods a competitive edge over imports from industrially more advanced
countries. Electrical and transport equipment are cases in point.
This may lead us to expect that manufactured exports from developing
countries need not remain limited to labour-intensive and/or
natural-resource-based Heckscher-Ohlin goods. Provided that the
industrialization process keeps momentum in the framework of adequate
economic policies, that both improved education systems and on-the-job
training result in upgrading skills of domestic workers, and that
physical capital as well as appropriate technology from abroad is
available, then today's industrializing countries have good prospects
for diversifying out of the simple labour-intensive items and for
including more and more skill- and capital-intensive goods in their
export bundle. The process which is now under way is still concentrated
on the less sophisticated items. Particularly chemicals, basic steel
products, and non-electrical engineering, which generally are
characterized by a high degree of complexity, are not yet on the list
of candidates for efficient export specialization. But while revealing
a comparative disadvantage (in some cases diminishing) there already
are tendencies towards increasing world market shares: pigments, manu-
factured fertilizers and explosives are examples in the field of
chemicals; ingots, bars, sheets and rails in the field of basic steel
industry; and wire products, agricultural machinery, textile machinery
in the field of non-electrical engineering products. This experience
indicates that there is in fact an ample and quantitatively significant
export potential; the degree to which it can be used, is, as we
have stated, largely a function of appropriate domestic economic policies.
An Appraisal of the Manufactured Export Potential
The preceding analysis lends itself as a point of departure for
assessing the manufactured export potential of the Sample countries
combined up to 1985. The knowledge of the export potential helps the
exporting countries to appraise the contribution to further industrial- 28 -
development, which manufactured export expansion can make. And it
gives importing countries, basically the highly developed ones,
an idea about how competitive pressure from abroad may increase
in years to come.
If only economic factors are taken into consideration, there
are two approaches to estimating the export potential, one ideal and
one pragmatic. The ideal approach would be to estimate by simultaneous
solution and for each individual country in the Kiel Project the
equilibrium export patterns by commodity en the basis of forecasts
about production, domestic demand, world trade and technological
innovations. We do not use this approach because the data available
and their reliability do not permit attaining a degree of accuracy
which warrant the enormous computational work involved. We will adopt
instead a less sophisticated and more pragmatic approach, which
requires much less knowledge about the future and which notwith-
standing its simplicity is likely to provide roughly the orders of
magnitudes we are looking for.
This approach rests upon the proposition that the Sample
countries will follow effective domestic policies to make the best
use of opportunities offered by the world market. In assessing the
export potential totally and for major groups of commodities as dis-
tinguished in Table IV, two variants have been calculated:
- The first one is a "no change" variant. We assume that the
industrial production and manufactured export tendencies of
the period 1962/6>1972/73 will continue to manifest themselves
in the period 1972/73-1985.
- The second variant is to provide for a temporary slackening of
industrial growth reflecting the adjustment need caused by the oil
price explosion. We assume that the rates of growth of manufac-
turing production will be constant in absolute terms for the- 29 -
remainder of this decade and resume in 1980 the path which appeared
in 1962-63-1972/73. The incremental export-to-output ratio is
supposed to remain constant over the whole projection period.
The trend values for production and export growth are equivalent to
the annual compound rates of the base period, which were calculated
logarithmicly in order to neutralize the effect of low initial values.
Where fresh official estimates were available at the time of this
writing (for instance for Colombia, Malaysia, Spain and Yugoslavia)
the results of extrapolation were, somewhat arbitrarily, adjusted.
The results are shown in Table V. In 1972/73 the 15 countries
supplied manufactured exports of almost $ 37 billion. This total
export capacity is expected to rise to 2> 156 billion (alternative I)
or 25 129 billion (alternative II) by 1985» representing a 4.3 or
3.5-fold increase respectively, with an annual average rate of growth
of 12.8 or 11.1 percent respectively. If processed food, beverages
and tobacco manufactures are excluded, the annual rate of increase
becomes 14.3 or 12.5 percent respectively. Both alternatives come out
with a significant change in manufactured export structure. While the
share of the more traditional items (such as processed agricultural
products, textiles, footwear and leather manufactures) will decline,
machinery and transport equipment will sharply increase its weight in
the export assortment. The root of this development lies, as we have
seen, in the recent past. The estimates are, in addition, consistent
with Banerji's |24j findings based on international cross-section
analyses showing that in the process of industrialization the share
of machinery and transport equipment in total manufactured exports
typically tends to increase.
Whether or not the estimates of manufactured exports potential
will be realized in practice is a matter of conjecture. It will
essentially depend on whether or not the assumptions made prove them-
selves to be realistic. In addition, there is no way of taking into
account the influence on the export potential of non-economic factors.- 30-
Table V



































































Source: Calculated from United Nations, Yearbook of National
Idem. The Growth of World Industry, New York, various
various issues. - Information provided by the authors
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Trade Statistics,31
For example, it is impossible to predict with any accuracy the eventual
outcome of the current demands for radical changes in the political
system of Spain, or the future development of political relations between
Egypt and Israel, or the long-run political stability in South Korea
and Taiwan in the aftermath of the Viet-Nam war. If these, and other,
unsettled problems cause fundamental disturbances within the economies,
the impact on the export capacity clearly will be adverse. In this
perspective, the export potential envisaged here might indicate a
maximum. However large the projected magnitude may appear to be, it
is not beyond attainment as explained in the next section on grounds
of import absorption capacity of the industrial countries.
IH. Market for Manufactures of Less Developed Countries
Despite the success of a growing number of countries in promoting
economic development by expanding exports of manufactured goods, a great
deal of skepticism prevails among economists and practitioners, especially
in the LDCs, concerning the viability of this activity as an avenue for
growth. This skepticism extends beyond the notion of manufacturing for
export as a full-blown development strategy to negate even the idea that
it can play a complementary role in the development process. The basis
for such pessimism does not fully rest on the perception of unmitigable
supply constraints, nor on the notion that LDCs are incompetitive in
world markets, many LDCs have revealed themselves to possess comparative
advantage in a wide range of goods. The basis for this skepticism
derives, instead, to a large extent from the problems perceived on the
demand side — that tariff and non-tariff barriers are restrictive,
that the markets for goods in which LDCs are competitive have already
been absorbed by the firstcomers, that successful emulation by any more
than a few small LDCs will provoke protectionist sentiments in market
countries further, that no matter how successful developing countries
might be in overcoming constraints in supplying manufactured goods for
export, their efforts will inevitably be frustrated by uncertainty of
demand.- 32 -
The question of whether or not demand is the ultimate obstacle
to manufactured export expansion is essentially an empirical issue.
Indeed, a good amount of empirical work has been done on separate
aspects of the issue, and much of it in recent years. The questions
involved are:
(1) Where are the prime markets for LDC manufactures?
(2) How large are these markets and how thoroughly penetrated
are they?
(3) What is the growth potential of these markets and how
stable are they?
(4) How restrictive are trade barriers to LDC exports of
manufactures, and what are the prospects for increased
or diminishing protection in the future?
Since any credible recommendation to LDCs to expand exports of
manufactures must come to grips with these questions, we shall attempt
to briefly pull together the results of recent empirical work, upon
which some judgement of the issues can be made.
Market Location
The dominance of the high-income,industrialized countries as
markets for LDC exports is revealed in Table VI. In 1973 developed
countries accounted for 75 percent of total LDC exports; in manufac-
tures (SITC 5-8) their share of LDC exports was almost equally as
large (71 percent). It is not surprising, of course, that the
developed countries play a preponderant role in LDC trade. The very
divergence in incomes in the two country-groups provides the basis
for trade between them. The greater this divergence, the greater are
the gains from trade. And, of course, the greater the gains, the less
trade restricting are transportation costs, tariff duties and other
market and non-market costs associated with international trade.- 33 -
Table VI






























































































































































































































Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, July 1975.34 -
Among the developed countriess the United States constitutes the
largest single market for LDC exports, alone accounting for 20 percent
of the total developed country imports from IDCs. U.S. imports from
LDCs of goods in which the latter find their greatest comparative
advantage, light, labour-intensive manufactures, are even more sig-
nificant, accounting for over 50 percent of total (see Appendix Table A-4).
The U.S., in addition to being the largest market in absolute size,
is the greatest importer from LDCs on a relative basis, with the
exception of Japan. In 1970, U.S. imports of labour-intensive manufac-
tures from LDCs constituted 24 percent of total US imports of such
goods. In Europe, only the United Kingdom and West Germany import on
any significant scale from LDCs.
The importance of the U.S. and Japan, and to a lesser extent the
U.K. and West Germany, as markets for LDC exports of manufactures, as
compared with other high-income developed countries, is not attributable
to differences in trade restrictions, nor to differences in potential
gains from such trade. The primary reason for the differences can be
traced to the countries direct participation in manufacturing for export
in developing countries (export-oriented direct foreign investment) and
the existence of appropriate marketing outlets for LDC manufactures.
The importance of direct foreign investment as a source of capital,
provider of labour-intensive technology and stimulant to export in
LDCs is well recognized. However, large retail organizations play
an equally important role (some contend more than equal ), not only
in marketing output, but also in identifying sources of production and
supplying "R & D" inputs by providing product specification enabling
LDC producers to keep abreast of changing tastes in the market countries.
Given the increasing popularity of low-cost retailing in the industrialized
countries, and the evident profitability of such adventures, one would
expect this kind of activity to spread in the
 Aature.
G.K. Helleiner, "Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries and
Multinational Firms", op.cit., pp. 21 sqq.
2
A. Hone, "Multinational Corporations and Multinational Buying Groups:
Their Impact on the Growth of Asia's Exports of Manufactures - Myth and
Realities", World Development, Vol. 2, February 1974, pp. 145-149.- 35 -
IVferket Size and Penetration
In 1965 Hal B. Lary wrote: "Imports from less developed countries
of many of the light consumer manufactures ... have scarcely scratched
the surface of the market." The point remains valid today, despite
the very rapid expansion of IDC exports of these goods since 1965.
Nevertheless, one frequently encounters the notion that firstcomers
have captured the market for labour-intensive manufactures in the
developed countries leaving little room for those who might emulate
their success. This is, in fact, the central premise of the"fallacy
of composition"-argument. Evidence, however, does not bear out this
contention. With the exception of leather and "miscellaneous manufactures",
imports (from all countries) amount to less than 10 percent of the U.S.
domestic market, aggregated on an ISIC 2-digit level (see Appendix
Table A-5)•
The point is made more convincing by examining the markets on a
more disaggregated level. Table VII shows the U.S. market situation in
the 3-4 digit ISIC groups in which LDCs have "revealed comparative
advantage" (as given in Table IV). Of this group, imports from all
countries constitute more than 20 percent of the U.S. market in seven
branches: sugar refining, textiles n.e.s., rubber footwear, radio and
T.V. sets, motorcycles and bicycles, dolls and artificial flowers. Of
this group, the LDC share exceeds 20 percent only in sugar refining,
textiles n.e.s., dolls and plastic flowers. In all other branches,
with the exception of rubber footwear and plywood, the LDC share of
the U.S. domestic market can only be regarded as insignificant. In
European markets the degree of LDC penetration is even less than in the
U.S.A. In Germany, for example, LDC imports constitute approximately
5 percent of total domestic market for manufactured goods.
H.B. Lary, Imports of ivfenufactures from Less Developed Countries
(New York: Colombia University Press for NBER, 196b), p.- 36 -
Table VII















































































































































































































































































































































































































































of U.S. Manufacturing Industries,- 37
In addition to the fact that these markets are far from saturated
with imports, Table VII reveals that most of the penetration which has
occurred is largely from developed, high-income countries, of which
Japan is the primary contributor. This would indicate that significant
(demand) potential exists for LDCs to expand their exports of manufac-
tures without increasing import penetration in developed-country
markets by replacing developed countries currently supplying these
markets. Such a process of country-substitution in exporting labour-
intensive manufactures to developed-country markets has been on-going
for some time, particularly in Asia. In the 1960s Hong Kong captured,
as Riedel [21, chapter 2] shows, a significant share of the traditional
Japanese market in the U.S. in textiles, electronics and plastic goods,
only to partially "lose" these markets later in the decade and in the
1970s to Taiwan and South Korea. In fact, Hong Kong did not "lose" at
all in any real sense since the colony at the same time found new
comparative advantage in more capital and skill-intensive branches.
The point is that the expansion of LDC exports of manufactures to
developed countries does not necessarily imply a pari passu increase
in the penetration of developed-country markets since considerable
potential for country substitution prevails.
It should be further noted that the statistics presented in
Table VII do not adequately reveal the range of potential export
products for LDCs. Synthetic hair pieces (wigs), for example, is but
one seemingly insignificant product falling under SIC code 39* Yet in
1970, Hong Kong exports of wigs (over U.S.-25 150 million) exceeded
the total value of exports from many developing countries. In other
words, for many LDCs to succeed in manufacturing for export a very
limited number of goods within the broad range of commodities in which
most LDCs possess a potential comparative advantage could be of
considerable consequence to their balance of payments position. More-
over, the range of manufactures in which LDCs possess comparative
advantage is increasing and will continue to increase, particularly
as the operation of multinational manufacturers and retailers expand
in the developing countries in the future.- 38 -
Market Grcwth
In addition to the expanding market potentials which LDCs might
expect to gain from out-competing developed country suppliers of goods
in which they possess their greatest comparative advantage, the market
for these goods is itself growing and thereby providing further expan-
sion opportunities. In recent years several empirical investigations
of import demand in developed countries for labour-intensive commodities
have been undertaken. Appendix Table A-6 summarizes the results of two
studies which attempted to estimate import demand functions by commodity
for the U.S. and West Germany. As the table indicates, the import demand
of each of the commodities examined is income elastic, implying that
demand for these goods will expand more than proportionally with
increasing income. The average income elasticity of demand of the goods
investigated in Table A-6 is 3-0, implying that a 3 percent per annum
growth of per capita income in developed countries will provide a
9 percent per annum growth of the LDC export markets.
Analogous to import demand function estimation in market-countries,
the market growth potential of IDC exports can be analyzed by estima-
ting the "export demand functions" of developing countries. There is
perhaps no better case for such an investigation than Hong Kong, since
the colony is the largest exporter of manufactures among developing
countries, exports almost exclusively to developed country markets,
and possesses no competing domestic market to complicate the estimation
model. The following estimate of income and price elasticities for
Hong Kong exports of manufactures was obtained from annual data,
1959-7** (t-ratios in parentheses):
Quantum and Unit Value indexes were provided by Dr. M.E. Morkre
of Hong Kong University. Other data were obtained from published
country sources.- 39 -
xr
In Q = -7.105 - -0.611 in I — - \ + 3.153 Jin Y
(-11.827) (-4.225) i P
X j (34.929)
R~
2 = .989 D.W. = 1.026
where
Q. = quantum exports in year t, t = 1959-7^
P. = unit value of Hong Kong exports in year t
r. = trade weighted average exchange rate
(domestic currency per US-2S, h -Sterling and D-Mark)
in year t.
P = trade weighted average of wholesale price of manu-
factures in Hong Kong's principle market countries
(U.S., U.K., P.R.G.) in year t.
Y. = trade weighted average real income in market countries
in year t.
These results are consistent with those reported in Table A-6 with
regard to income elasticity of demand. They are, however, along with
those reported above, subject to severe methodological and conceptual
qualifications. Aside from the obvious problems of comparability
between price series, the estimates suffer from identification bias
since both export-demand and import-demand estimates ignore the
supply forces which are operating simultaneously. Since we have
suggested above that it is supply constraints which are most
prominent factors to export expansion, all we can reasonably infer
from these results is that an expansion of imports three times in
excess of the growth of income is not inconceivable, as past experiencebears witness. This in itself is of some interest, however, given
the general pessimism with which expansion of IDC exports of manu-
factures to high-income countries is viewed.
Market Barriers
The commercial policy of developed countries is probably the most
widely proclaimed deterrent to IDC trade in manufactures. Certainly
there is no question that tariff barriers discriminate against IDCs.
Developing countries face trade barriers on 47 percent of their non-
fuel exports to developed countries. Raw materials, which account
for 56 percent of developing country exports, face barriers on
27 percent of their value, whereas food and manufactures encounter
barriers on 68 percent of their value. Moreover, tariff levels are
higher for LDCs than for developed country exports. The average "most
favoured nation" (m.f.n.) tariff on dutiable non-fuel trade is 15 per-
cent for developing country exports, whereas it is 10 percent for
developed country exports. In addition to tariff barriers, non-
tariff barriers are applied to 23 percent of developing countries'
non-fuel exports, the majority being applied in the areas of food,
textiles and leather goods.
It is well documented that one of the primary motives of
commercial policy in the industrialized countries is to project or
subsidize labour, in particular relatively unskilled, immobile labour.
As we know from the Stopler-Samuelson theorem, the imposition of a
tariff on a commodity increase the real return to the factor used
intensively in its production. It is therefore not surprising, given
the political leverage of organized labour, that one finds the
structure of tariff levels in developed countries positively correlated
The statistics quoted in this paragraph were obtained from UNCTAD,
"Trade Barriers Pacing Developing Countries", Preliminary Findings,
unpublished, August 1974.- 41 -
with the degree of labour-intensity of production across industries.
Moreover, it has been argued that in the process of trade policy
liberalization stemming from the Kennedy Round the structural bias
against LDCs has been intensified as tariff reductions have been more
modest in the branches in which LDCs are most competitive, and
because greatest substitution of non-tariff protection has occurred
2
in these branches.
Although there is no question that commercial policy of developed
countries is biased against LDCs, the question remains as to just how
detrimental this protection is to the expansion of LDC exports — that
is, are tariffs a binding constraint. One way to evaluate this
question is to determine how responsive LDC exports to developed
countries have been to previous tariff reductions. Analysis of the
early 1950 GATT negotiations (Annecy Round 1950 and Torquay Round 1951)
revealed that tariff concessions had in general a negligible impact on
LDC exports.-^ Although the Geneva Round (1956) and Dillon Round (1961)
do appear to have had an impact on total imports in developed countries,
their impact on imports from LDCs seems to have been minor. U.S. con-
cessions at the Dillon Round appear to have influenced primarily LDC
See, for instance, M. Constantopoulos, "Labour Protection in Western
Europe", European Economic Review, Vol. 5> December 1974, pp. 313-328. -
B.N. Vaccara, Employment and Output in Protected Manufacturing Industries
(Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, I960). - J.B. Donges, G. Pels,
A.D. Neu et al., "Protektion und Branchenstruktur der westdeutschen
Wirtschaft", Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1974 (Kieler Studien No. 123).
2
J. H. Cheh, "United States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short
Run Labour Adjustment Costs", Journal of International Economics, Vol. 4,
November 1974, pp. 323-340. - G. Pels, "Assistance to Industry in
West Germany", Kiel Working Papers, No. 14, March 1974.
JL.B. Krause, "United States Imports and the Tariff", American Economic
Review, Vol. 49, May 1959, pp. 542-51.
2i
M.E. Kreinin, "Effect of Tariff Changes on the Prices and Volumes of
Imports", American Economic Review, Vol. 51, June 1961, pp. 310-24. -
J.M. Finger, "GATT Tariff Concessions and the Exports of Developing
Countries - United States Concessions at the Dillon Round", Economic
Journal, Vol. 84, September 1975, pp. 566-75.exports of "non-LDC-type
!
f goods. While on the other hand, it is main-
tained that, "IDC exports of the LDC basket of goods to the United
States were not significantly influenced by the tariff concessions ..."
because" ... the cost differences between the United States and LDC
suppliers is so large that a tariff concession equivalent to .5 percent
of f.o.b. price is not a significant additional export incentive."
UNCTAD analysis of the effects of the Kennedy Round reductions
similarly found that LDCs responded more strongly to tariff cuts on
"non-IDC-type" goods than to cuts in which they have their strongest
comparative advantage. Comparing rates of increase of imports between
commodity groups receiving small tariff reductions and those receiving
large tariff cuts, UNCTAD concluded that tariff elasticities range
from (minus) 5-10, from which it is asserted that" ... one can
definitely put aside the argument that developing countries do not
2 respond to marginal incentives of tariff reductions." Elasticities
derived in this manner are, however, extremely dubious since no account
is taken of either supply or demand factors at work, other than to assume
that they are the same in both groups. Moreover, these "elasticities" are
at complete divergence with the price elasticities in Table A-6. It is,
of course, possible that "tariff elasticities" could differ from other
price elasticities if the announcement effect of tariff changes is very
strong. However, it is difficult to imagine that the announcement effect
could be strong enough to account for such a difference. When one considers
the tremendous cost differentials between LDCs and the developed countries
in producing labour-intensive manufactures ~ the fact that developed
country labour costs are on average 8 times greater than in IDCs (see
Table VIII) ~ it is difficult to imagine that existing tariff levels
could be an obstacle, or for that matter that marginal tariff reductions
could be much of an incentive to IDCs to expand their exports of manufactures.
Finger, op. cit., p. 572.
UNCTAD, op. cit., p. 44. Results are published in J.M. Finger, "Effects
of the Kennedy Round Tariff Concessions", Economic Journal, Vol. 86,
March 1976, pp. 87-95.Table VIII
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS IN LDC ESTABLISHMENTS PROCESSING OR ASSEMBLING
U.S. MATERIALS, AND ESTIMATED EARNINGS FOR COMPARABLE JOBS IN THE U.S.







































The evidence presented here and, with more details, in the Kiel
Project country studies leadsus to give clear answers to the two relevant
questions raised in the Introduction of this paper. First, domestic
economic policies which are geared to integrate the industrialization
process of developing countries into the world economy do work. It is
not to be expected that after a long phase of import-substituting
industrialization, an overspill from import substitution to exports
will occur automatically. But by means of consequent export promotion- 44
measures potential comparative advantage can be translated into a
rapid and diversified expansion of manufactured exports. Therefore,
developing countries must not wait for actions undertaken by industria-
lized countries in order to become exporters of manufacturers at a
reasonable scale. If the trend in outward-looking policies of LDCs is
maintained in the foreseeable future, the patterns of world trade will
undergo an important restructuring — with LDCs increasingly supplying
industrialized countries with manufactured products.
Second, there must not be any effective limit on the demand side
to the expansion of manufactured exports in LDCs. The market for these
countries' exports of manufactures is large, growing and contains great
potential for LDCs competing along lines of comparative advantage
(understood in a dynamic sense). Tariff barriers do not appear to be
restrictive, given the great divergence in production costs in those
areas where LDCs have comparative advantage. Non-tariff barriers do
constitute an obstacle, in the case of quotas an unsurmountable one,
but they are confined to a few traditional industries. There is no
strong evidence of a proliferation of non-tariff barriers accompanying
the past expansion of LDC exports of non-textile manufactures. Moreover,
given the diversity of the market in terms of product and geography,
and the fact that LDCs account for such an insignificant share of
most markets in developed countries, there is little reason to believe
that barriers will necessarily be raised in the future. The concern
in developed countries about the employment implications of expanded
trade with LDCs appears very much overdone. First of all, it has
been shown that the developed countries' "revealed capacity to adjust"
(as measured by rates of normal expansion and contraction of employment
in different branches) is greater than anything which would be required
if all developed countries prescribed to a full GSP scheme. Secondly,
J.M. Finger, "The Generalised Scheme of Preferences - Impact on
the Lower Countries", Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 25,
May 1973, pp. 43-54.- 45-
a study of West Germany has shown that normal cyclical fluctuations
in aggregate demand will have a greater impact on employment in the
Federal Republic than that which will occur if current rates of expan-
sion of imports of manufactures from LDCs continue. Nevertheless,
developed countries continue to impose tariffs while at the same tine
placating the developing countries with promises of concessions and
special favours. Many developing countries at the same time, prefer
to ignore the experience of their snail group of superlative develop-
ment performers, and instead to find a scapegoat for their failures
in cliches such as the fallacy of composition argument.
H. Dicke, et al., Beschaftigungswirkungen einer verstSrkten
Arbeitsteilung zwischen der Bundesrepublik und den Entwicklungs-
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Source : Calculated from IBRD, World Tables 1973. - ILO, Yearbook oj Labour Statistics 1974. -
United Nations, The Growth of World Industry 1973 Edition, Vol. 1, New York. - Idem, Commodity
Trade Statistics, 1972, 1973. - National production and trade statistics as quoted in the country studies.Table A-3 Selected Indicators on Economic Growth. Industrialization and Export Expansion In th» Sample Countries. 1960-73


















Constant prices, — For Egypt,
Absolute Increase of manufactured



































































export value divided by absolute increase of manufacturing value













































































Source 1 As Table A-2.Table A-4 - IMPORTS OF SELECTED LABOUR INTENSIVE MANUFACTURES FROM LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1970
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Source: Taken from R. Banerji, "The Export Performance of Less Developed Countries op. cit., p. 447
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Table A-5































































































































































































































































































































Source: As Table VII.- 58 -
Table A-6








































































Source: For the U.S., estimates from quarterly data 1964-70 reported in M.E. Kreinin,
"Disaggregated Import Demand Functions r Further Results", Southern Economic
Journal, Vol. 40, July 1973, pp. 20-21. For Germany, estimates from annual
data 1962-72, reported in Hans H. Glismann, "Die gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Kosten der Protektion", Kiel Discussion Papers, No. 35, October 1974, pp. 6-7.